University of Baltimore Law Forum
Volume 26
Number 1 Summer/Fall 1995

Article 5

1995

Recent Developments: Mayor of Baltimore v.
Cassidy: When Presumption of Permanent Total
Disability Is Conclusively Rebutted, the Loss of
Vision in Both Eyes Is to Be Compensated under
9-627(k) "Other Cases" Section of Permanent
Partial Disability Statute as Opposed to Doubling
the Rate of the Scheduled Loss of Vision in One
Eye
Francis A. Pommett III

Follow this and additional works at: http://scholarworks.law.ubalt.edu/lf
Part of the Law Commons
Recommended Citation
Pommett, Francis A. III (1995) "Recent Developments: Mayor of Baltimore v. Cassidy: When Presumption of Permanent Total
Disability Is Conclusively Rebutted, the Loss of Vision in Both Eyes Is to Be Compensated under 9-627(k) "Other Cases" Section of
Permanent Partial Disability Statute as Opposed to Doubling the Rate of the Scheduled Loss of Vision in One Eye," University of
Baltimore Law Forum: Vol. 26 : No. 1 , Article 5.
Available at: http://scholarworks.law.ubalt.edu/lf/vol26/iss1/5

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by ScholarWorks@University of Baltimore School of Law. It has been accepted for inclusion in
University of Baltimore Law Forum by an authorized editor of ScholarWorks@University of Baltimore School of Law. For more information, please
contact snolan@ubalt.edu.

RECENT DEVELOPMENTS

Mayor of Baltimore
v. Cassidy:
WHEN
PRESUMPTION OF
PERMANENT
TOTAL DISABILITY
IS CONCLUSIVELY
REBUTTED, THE
LOSS OF VISION
IN BOTHEYES
IS TO BE
COMPENSATED
UNDER 9-627(k)
"OTHER CASES"
SECTION OF
PERMANENT
PARTIAL DISABILITY
STATUTE AS
OPPOSED TO
DOUBLING THE
RATE OF THE
SCHEDULED LOSS
OF VISION IN ONE
EYE.

In Mayor of Baltimore
v. Cassidy, 338 Md. 88, 656
A.2d 757 (1995), the Court of
Appeals of Maryland ruled that
the loss of vision in both eyes is
to be compensated pursuant to
Maryland Annotated Code section 9-627(k) of the Labor &
Employment Article, as opposed to doubling the rate for
the scheduled loss of vision in
one eye, when the presumption
of permanent total disability has
been overcome. Thus, while
the Workers' Compensation
Act ("WCA") is to be liberally
construed in favor of injured
employees, a court or reviewing body may not disregard the
Act's plain meaning.
Police officer Eugene
Cassidy ("Cassidy") was shot
inthehead on October 22, 1987,
in the line of duty. The injury
left him blind in both eyes and
caused a permanent loss oftaste
and smell. Following the incident, Cassidy was given a position as an instructor at the Police Academy at a salary greater
than that which he had received
while on active duty. Upon
Cassidy's petition for compensation, the Workers' Compensation Commission ("Commission") held a hearing to determine the nature and extent of
Cassidy's injuries. In applying
section 9-627(k), "Other Cases" provision of the WCA, the
Commission determined that
Cassidy suffered an 85% industrial loss of the use of his body
and awarded him compensation at the rate of $244.00 per
week for 567 weeks.

Cassidy appealed to the
Circuit Court for Baltimore
City. He challenged the Commission's finding that his loss
of vision was determinable under section 9-627(k) and not at
double the rate ofthe scheduled
loss of vision in one eye under
section 9-627( d)(1 )(vi). Such a
determination would have allowed Cassidy to collect compensation for an additional 100
weeks due to an adjustment for
serious disability pursuant to
section 9-630 of the WCA.
Thus, Cassidy would have received an additional $24,400.00
from doubling the scheduled
loss. The circuit court agreed
with Cassidy and held that the
loss ofvision in both eyes should
have been determined at double
the rate of the scheduled loss
for one eye. The Court ofSpecial Appeals of Maryland affirmed on appeal. The Court of
Appeals of Maryland granted
certiorari to determine whether
the loss of vision in two eyes,
where the presumption of permanent total disability has been
overcome, was compensable at
double the rate for the scheduled loss of one eye or under
section 9-627(k), "Other Cases."
The court of appeals
began its analysis by determining that whether the loss of two
eyes is considered a scheduled
loss is a matter of statutory construction. Cassidy, 338 Md. at
93, 656 A.2d at 760. Accordingly, the court held that only
when a statute is unclear or ambiguous is it necessary to address its legislative purpose. Id.
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at 94, 656 A.2d at 760. As
section 9-627 was specific in its
use of the singular and plural
for loss of body parts or their
use, there was no statutory ambiguity. Id. at 96, 656 A.2d at
761. While recognizing that
the WCA should be liberally
construed in favor of the injured employee, the court of
appeals explained that the Commission and reviewing courts
"may not disregard the plain
meaning of the Act in the name
of liberal construction." Id. at
97,656 A.2d at 762. The court
further ruled that section 9-627
was neither unclear nor ambiguous as it related to the loss of
two eyes. Id. Since the loss of
vision in both eyes was not specifically enumerated as a scheduled loss, it must be determined
under section 9-627(k), "Other
Cases." Id.
The court of appeals
then addressed the presumption
of permanent total disability for
the loss of both eyes under
section 9-63 6(b) ofthe Labor &
Employment Article. Id. While
this type of disability did not
require the claimant to be completely helpless, it did mean
that the claimant "is able to
perform services so limited in
quality, dependability, or quantity, that a reasonably stable
market for them does not exist." Id. The court, however,
held that this presumption was
conclusively rebutted by the fact
that not only did a market exist
for Cassidy's services, but he
also earned more as an instruc-
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tor at the Police Academy than
he did prior to the accident. Id.
at 98-99, 656 A.2d at 762. If
Cassidy were not permanently
totally disabled, he must therefore be permanently partially
disabled, and thus section 9627 must apply. Id. at 99, 656
A.2d 762.
The court continued its
review by examining the scope
of the Commission's discretion
under 9-627(k) and its exercise,
even though neither party had
contestedit.Id. at 103, 656A.2d
at 764. Unlike scheduled losses, a loss under section 9-627 (k)
required the Commission to
determine the extent of disability and its impairment of the
industrial use of the claimant's
body, along with his specific
occupational characteristics. Id.
Although the scheduled loss for
a single body part could not be
doubled to determine an award
per se, that amount was a good
indication of whether the Commission had abused its discretion in making an award under
section 9-627(k). Id. In the
instant case, however, the presumption ofpermanent total disability for the loss of sight in
both eyes had been overcome,
thus foreclosing an award of
100% disability under permanentpartial.Id. at 104,656 A.2d
at 765. The court recognized
the expertise of the Commission in determining awards in
such situations and stated, "[t ]he
question of when a specific injury becomes 'an other injuries' type often presents a shad-

owy line of demarcation and
calls for the wise discretion of
the ... Commission ... in the
light of substantial facts of evidence." Id. Therefore, the court
reasoned, a finding of85% permanent partial disability under
section 9-627 (k) would not have
been an abuse of discretion by
the Commission had the issue
even been raised. Id. at 105,656
A.2d at 766.
In Mayor of Baltimore
v. Cassidy, 338 Md. 88, 656
A.2d 757 (1995), the Court of
Appeals of Maryland ruled a
scheduled loss may not be doubled for compensation purposes and must be considered under section 9-627(k), "Other
Cases." In so doing, the court
clarified the scope of the permanent partial disability statute, the calculation ofWorkers '
Compensation benefits, and the
Commission's exercise of discretion in determining an award
under section 9-627.
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